Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000 by Richard Blundell & Hilary W. Hoynes
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic
Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000
Volume Author/Editor: David Card, Richard Blundell and
Richard B. Freeman, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-09284-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/card04-1
Conference Date: December 8-9, 2000
Publication Date: June 2004
Title: Has 'In-Work' Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?
Author: Richard Blundell, Hilary W. Hoynes
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6753Has “In-Work” Benefit Reform 
Helped the Labor Market? 
Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
10.1  Introduction 
Welfare policy toward low-income families in the United Kingdom ex- 
perienced a significant shift toward “in-work” benefits in the late 1980s  and 
1990s. Although a work requirement for some forms of benefit receipt has 
existed in the United Kingdom since the late 1970s, the shift in policy be- 
gan in earnest with the introduction of the Family Credit (FC) in 1988-a 
minimum-working-hours-based credit for families with children. After a 
number of reforms during the early 1990s, FC  was replaced by the Work- 
ing Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in 1999. Over this period the generosity 
of these “in-work” benefit schemes also increased, enhancing the empha- 
sis that has been placed in welfare reform on supplementing low incomes 
in work for adults with dependent children (see Blundell2002). As of 2000, 
there are over 1  million recipients, contrasting with less than 250,000 when 
FC was introduced. Expenditure per recipient has also increased dramat- 
ically over this period, rising fourfold in real terms. 
But what of the impact on the labor market? There have been two main 
target groups for in-work benefit policy reform in the United Kingdom. 
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These target groups reflect a rise in the proportion of families with no par- 
ent working in the  1980s and early  1990s. For single parents and low- 
skilled couples with children, labor market attachment steadfastly refused 
to rise after the sharp fall in the early 1980s recession-quite  against the 
overall trend. Single parent employment rates fell by 20 percentage points 
in the early 1980s and have remained well below that experienced by many 
of the United  Kingdom’s European neighbors. For women with unem- 
ployed husbands, the fall in employment was even more marked, remain- 
ing at little over 20 percent. Over the same period the overall trend for mar- 
ried mothers saw a continuing growth, and employment among single 
women without children remained  around the 80 percent level. For the 
United States the picture is quite different. The early 1980s decline in em- 
ployment was short lived and was followed by a 14 percentage point in- 
crease in the 1990s. For couples with children in the United States, there 
was a steady increase in employment for both parents. The behavior of 
these different groups in the United Kingdom and the differences in em- 
ployment trends with similar groups in the United States presents us with 
a puzzle. This is the focus of this study. 
The comparison with the U.S. system of in-work benefits is particularly 
useful. Like the system in the United Kingdom, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) in the United States has grown significantly in terms of cov- 
erage and generosity over the past two decades. As of 1999, it has seen a 
fourfold increase in caseload, and expenditure per recipient has tripled in 
real terms. It is now the largest cash program directed toward working fam- 
ilies in the United States, with nearly 20 million recipients. Not only are the 
United States and the United Kingdom similar in being at the forefront of 
the use of in-work benefits, but the two nations’ other socioeconomic pro- 
files also bear interesting similarities. The proportion of single parents in 
the United States and the United Kingdom more than doubled over the 
past two decades-one  reason why this group featured so centrally in the 
policy agenda. Moreover, single parents in both countries began the pe- 
riod, the late 1970s, with very similar employment rates, close to those of 
married women with children. Both countries experienced a similar rise in 
employment rates of married women with children. The real contrast is the 
gain in employment for single parents in the United States and the higher 
employment rates among low-skilled couples with children. 
Although the administration of the system in the United States is some- 
what different from that in the United Kingdom, we do not attribute the 
apparent differences in impact on labor supply to this. Instead, we  high- 
light certain distinct features of the U.K. system. First, unlike the EITC, 
income from in-work benefits is counted as income in the computation of 
other benefits-in  particular, housing benefits. This is shown to signifi- 
cantly dampen the labor supply incentives created by the in-work benefit 
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the early 1980s in the United Kingdom. Second, over the same period much 
of the increase in the generosity of in-work benefits has been matched by 
increases in the generosity of income support-available  to low-income 
nonworking families with children. In particular, increases in child credits 
in the in-work benefit system have been matched by similar increases in the 
generosity in the child component of income support. There has also been 
a substantive increase in the real value of the universal child benefit. If any- 
thing, these increases act as an income effect and against increased em- 
ployment in the target groups. Again this contrasts importantly with the 
United States, where there has been a relative decline in the value of out- 
of-work income supports. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, 
the underlying labor market trends are presented. Section 10.3 describes 
the reforms in the United Kingdom and their impact on work incentives. 
Section 10.4 draws a direct comparison with the impact of EITC reforms 
in the United States. In section 10.5 we evaluate the recent WFTC reform 
in the United Kingdom. Section 10.6 concludes. 
10.2  Trends in Labor Supply over the 1980s and 1990s 
Although differences in the pattern of working behavior across different 
groups at any point in time can be suggestive of important impacts of 
financial incentives, it is the time series behavior of labor supply for groups 
of individuals who have been subject to changing incentives that is of di- 
rect policy interest. This is precisely the way the puzzle in the introduction 
was posed  between the employment behavior of  single mothers in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
In this section we focus on trends in the United Kingdom over the last 
two decades but also draw on evidence from the United States where com- 
parisons are particularly informative. One well-documented trend that oc- 
curred in both countries over this period is the shift in returns to education 
and skill. We  do not reproduce  them here, but  they have certainly  re- 
inforced the arguments for increasing the generosity of in-work benefits for 
low-income workers’ families. 
Macroeconomic conditions over the past two decades differed some- 
what in the United States and United Kingdom. There are two large reces- 
sions in the United Kingdom, onein 1980-1981 and one in 1991-1993. The 
recession in the United States in the early 1990s  was shorter and less severe. 
For the remainder of the 1990s the United States experienced an unprece- 
dented expansion, with unemployment rates lower than they had been in 
three decades. The expansion in the United Kingdom occurred much later 
and at a slower pace. It is likely that the differences in the strength of the la- 
bor markets across the two countries explain some of the difference in the 
employment trends discussed here. This may be especially important for 414  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
low-education groups, who are typically found to be more sensitive to busi- 
ness cycles (Hoynes 2000). 
10.2.1 
To describe these trends we  draw on a number of data sets from the 
United Kingdom and the United States. These are briefly described in the 
data appendix. Figure 10.1 shows the fraction of women working in the 
United Kingdom by marital status and presence of children from 1978 to 
1999. Figure 10.2 shows a similar contrast for the United States. We have 
selected women aged between twenty and fifty-five for this comparison. 
There are many similarities in employment for women in the United 
Kingdom and the United States over this time period. First, single parents 
have very similar employment rates at the beginning of the period, at about 
55 to 60 percent. These are close to those for married women with children. 
Second, the labor market attachment for married women, especially those 
with children, saw a steady rise over the period in both countries. For ex- 
ample, in  the  United  States,  somewhat  less  than  one-half  of  married 
women with children worked at all in 1979, compared to almost 70 percent 
in 2000. Third, single women without children experienced a rather more 
stable and higher level of employment, at around 80 percent, over these two 
decades in both countries. 
The differences between the United Kingdom and United States, how- 
ever, are striking. First, the employment for all groups was more severely 
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reduced in the United Kingdom during the recession in the early 1980s. 
Second, single mothers in the United Kingdom saw little recovery from the 
initial decline in employment in the early 1980s. In the United States, be- 
ginning in the early 1990s, employment in this group increased dramati- 
cally, from 60 to 73 percent.’ Married women saw steady increases in work 
over this period. The increase in employment among single women with 
children in the United States is not due to a cohort effect. When the em- 
ployment trends are presented by cohort, the increase in employment is 
shared by  all but  the oldest  age groups. In fact, among less-educated 
women the gains are largest for the youngest cohort. 
10.2.2  A Focus on Single Mothers 
In-work benefit reform will provide the greatest incentives for those in- 
dividuals who can only attract a low market wage. One  way to focus on this 
“incentivized” group is to consider those with lower levels of schooling. 
Figures 10.3  and 10.4 consider the pattern of employment by education for 
single mothers in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively. In 
both the United Kingdom and the United States, single women were an  in- 
creasing share of all women over this period. In contrast, the fraction of 
women who are married with children is declining steadily over this period. 
1. The U.S. definition of work is “working at all last week,” which is chosen to be compa- 
rable to the U.K. definition of “employment in the past two weeks.” An additional measure 
that may capture better the intensity of work is the average number of weeks worked last year. 
In figures not shown here, the trends for the average weeks worked show much the same pat- 
tern as those for “worked at all last week.” 0.70  ~ 
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Single women with children represent an increasing fraction of all women, 
especially among less-educated women. By the end of the 1990s this group 
represented nearly one-fifth of all low-educated working-age women in the 
United Kingdom, up from around 6 percent at the turn of the 1980s. 
These trends for low-educated single parents are presented for the pe- 
riod since 1984. This period is primarily chosen so that the larger Labour 
Force Survey can be utilized for the United Kingdom, but it also coincides 
with the period over which most of the action on in-work benefit reforms 
has taken place. 
The differences between  the employment patterns for women in  the 
United Kingdom versus the United States presented previously are also ev- 
ident here. In the United Kingdom the employment pattern for the lower- 
educated single mothers, those who left school at age sixteen (the minimum 
school-leaving age), is very similar to the picture for all single mothers. The 
employment rate for lower-education single mothers remained quite low 
throughout the period. In contrast, in the United States the employment 
rate of lower-educated single women with children increased from 50 per- 
cent in 1994 to almost 67 percent in 2000, a gain of more than 16 percent- 
age points. Indeed, in the United States, by  the end of the period, low- 
educated single women with children were working more than married 
women with children, and almost as much as single women without chil- 
dren. This increase has received tremendous attention in the United States 
and is the subject of some debate as to how much of this can be attributed 
to policy versus the strong economy. 
One additional feature of the U.K. data for single women that will be im- 
portant for the discussion of in-work benefit reform is the distribution of 
hours of work. As will be discussed, since 1992 the U.K. system has pro- 
vided a strong incentive for single mothers to work at least sixteen hours 
per week. The frequency histogram for low-education single women with 
and without children in the United Kingdom over three recent years is pre- 
sented in figure 10.5. The peak at sixteen hours for single mothers is clear. 
10.2.3  Workless Couples with Children 
The in-work benefit reforms in the United Kingdom have targeted both 
single parents and workless couples. Figure 10.6 shows the growing im- 
portance of this latter group in the United Kingdom toward the end of the 
1980s and the early 1990s. In the 1980s recession, the percentage of mar- 
ried couples with children without an earner increased substantially. 
Figure 10.6 shows that, similar to the pattern for single mothers, this rate 
has not declined much in the subsequent period. This pattern is not found 
in the United States, however. Like the increase in employment among 
single women with children, the fraction of married couples without any 
work has been in decline. In fact, even among low-educated couples, the Single Mothers. low education 
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Source: U.K. FES data. 
Note: Low education is head “left school at age sixteen or before.” 
later period shows declines in the workless rate, down to less than 5 percent 
by 2000. 
10.3  History and Reforms to In-Work Benefits 
In the United Kingdom, in-work benefit reform has been motivated as a 
method of poverty relief that does not create adverse work incentives. This 
is achieved by targeting low-income families with an income supplement 
that is contingent on work. Eligibility typically has been based on family 
income and requires the presence of children, reflecting in part the higher 
welfare benefits for families with children, partly a desire to help low- 
income working families, and partly the costs of child care and the like. 
Consequently, these benefits are most heavily targeted toward single par- 
ents and low-income couples with children. Increasingly, they are also be- 
ing extended to low-income workers without children.* The family in- 
come-based  eligibility rules and the interaction with other aspects of the 
tax and benefit system make the analysis of incentives for in-work benefits 
more complex than they may first appear. 
Table 10.1 provides a timeline of the evolution of in-work benefits in the 
United Kingdom  and the United States since their introduction in the 
1970s. In the United Kingdom, Family Income Supplement (FIS), which 
2. See the proposed Working Tax Credit (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2000). 420  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
Table 10.1  Timeline of Developments  in In-Work Benefits in the United Kingdom and the 
United States 












Family Income Supplement (FIS) intro- 
duced as a means-tested in-work benefit 
Earned Income Tax Credit (E1TC)introduced 
with maximum credit of $400 
Increase in EITC generosity and credit rate 
FIS replaced by Family Credit (FC)  with in- 
creased generosity and lower MWRs (most 
instances of MWRs > 100% were removed); 
24 hours work per week needed to qualify 
Increase in EITC generosity; separate rate 
for two or more children; requirement for 
applicants to earn more than received in wel- 
fare removed; EITC no longer counted in 
means-tested programs’ income calculations 
Qualifying conditions reduced to 16 hours 
per week 
Substantial increase in EITC generosity, 
particularly for families with 2 or more chil- 
dren (phased in over 1994-1996); EITC for 
workers without children introduced 
Extra crcdit introduced for working more 
than 30 hours per week 
PRWORA reformed AFDClTANF 
Working Families’ Tax Credit replaces FC 
with increased generosity, longer phase-out 
portion, and more generous support for 
child care 
Increase in generosity; credit paid through 
the wage packet 
Source: Brewer (2000). 
provided an earnings supplement for those families with at least one full- 
time worker, was introduced in 1971. Like FIS in the United Kingdom, the 
EITC in the United States was also introduced in the 1970s as a way of 
offsetting the payroll tax for low-income U.S.  working families. The change 
in the composition of low-income households and the fall in labor market 
attachment in certain family types further refocused the policy debate in 
both countries and highlighted the implicit tax on income faced by such 
low-income families in the tax and benefit system. In the United Kingdom 
FIS was reformed and renamed Family Credit (FC) in 1988, which finally Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  421 
mutated into the current Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in 1999. 
Each step increased the generosity of the credit and mirrored, to some ex- 
tent, the increase in generosity that occurred in the reforms to EITC in the 
United States. 
10.3.1  The U.K. System of In-Work Benefits and 
Comparison to U.S. In-Work Benefits 
The current system of in-work benefits in the United Kingdom is the 
WFTC. Introduced in October 1999, it increased the generosity of in-work 
support  relative to the previous FC system through a larger adult and child 
credit, a less severe benefit reduction rate, and a new child care credit. The 
main provisions of the WFTC are outlined in Table 10.2. Eligibility for the 
WFTC requires having dependent children, working at least sixteen hours 
per week, and having income and assets below the limit. The basic weekly 
credit is E53.15, and it is phased out at a rate of 55 percent. Both single and 
married couples are eligible. A useful way of viewing the characteristics of 
the British system is in comparison with the U.S. EITC. Eligibility for the 
EITC, also outlined in table  10.2, requires dependent children, positive 
earned income, and having income below the limit. The credit is phased in 
at a 34 (40) percent rate and phased out at a rate of 15.98 (21.06) percent 
for families with one child (two or more children). 
A picture of the two systems in terms of their gross transfers is given 
in figure 10.7. These are evaluated for a minimum-wage single parent with 
one and with two eligible children in both systems, assuming that eligibil- 
ity and receipt continued for a complete year. The broad similarities in the 
programs include larger credits for two-child families and the phasing out 
of the benefits. The differences are also clear from the figure. The vertical 
rise in eligibility in the U.K. system corresponds to the minimum hours el- 
igibility at sixteen hours. At sixteen hours the U.K. recipient receives the 
maximum she is eligible for. This contrasts with the U.S. proportionate tax 
credit up to the maximum amount. The U.K. system also displays a much 
steeper withdrawal, reflecting a higher benefit reduction rate. This provides 
for a greater degree of targeting in the U.K. system but the potential for 
higher implicit tax rates. There are many additional specific idiosyncrasies 
to each of these systems (see Brewer [2000] for an in-depth recent compar- 
ison). 
Overall, for low-earning families the U.K. system can be quite generous, 
significantly more so than the U.S. system. This is also clear from figure 
10.8, which presents per-recipient expenditures in both countries since the 
1970s. Notice also the fourfold increase in spending per recipient in the 
United Kingdom between 1970 and 2000. However, as figure 10.9 docu- 
ments, the caseloads for these two systems are quite different. By 2000, in 
the United  States there are nearly 20 million recipients, whereas in the 
United Kingdom there are approaching 1 million recipients, even though Table 10.2  Details of WFTC and EITC Operation 
Working Families Tax Credit 












Must work more than 16 hours a week, 
have dependent children (under 16 or 
under 19 and in full-time education), have 
less than f8,000 capital. Couples need to 
claim jointly; need not be married. 
Extension to those without dependent 
children proposed alongside an integrated 
child credit. 
Structure 
Credit is weekly. 
Basic credit of f53.15 plus possible 30 
hour credit of El 1.25 plus credits for each 
child at f25.60 or f26.35 for 16-18s. 
Child care tax credit is supplementary to 
this. 
Beyond threshold of f91.45, tapered at 
55%. 
Interaction with Other Purts qf Tux 
Net income (i.e., income after income tax 
and national insurance). 
Self-employed: same definition of income 
as for other tax liabilities. 
Child benefit, Statutory Maternity Pay, 
attendance allowance, maintenance pay- 
ments, Housing Benefit, and Council Tax 
Benefit awards 
Must have positive earnings in past year 
and annual investment income under 
$2,350. 
Married couples need to file ajoint tax 
return; unmarried couples file separately. 
Parents need to have a “qualifying” child 
(either theirs or their spouse’s, or any 
other child that was cared for all year). 
“Children” are under 19, under 24 and a 
student, or permanently and totally dis 
abled. 
Where a child potentially qualifies two 
unmarried adults for EITC. only the 
adult with the higher income can apply 
(this includes multiple tax unit-house- 
holds). 
Credit is annual and is a fraction of an- 
nual income up to a maximum level of 
$353/$2,353/$3,888 for families with no, 
1,  or more than 1 children 
Phase-in threshold applies a 7.65%,/34%/ 
40% credit (for no, 1, more than 1 chil- 
dren) to income until maximum credit 
reached. 
Beyond threshold of $12,690 ($5,770 for 
no children), tapered at 7.65”/0/15.98%/ 
21.06% so that runs out at $10,380/ 
$27,413/$31,152 (for no, I  child, more 
than 1 children). 
and Benefit System 
Gross earnings or “modified adjusted 
gross income” if modified adjusted gross 
income is higher and claimant is on the 
taper (modified adjusted gross income is 
income minus standard deductions for 
tax purposes). 
Self-employed: same definition of income 
as for other tax liabilities. 
TANF and food stamps are not taxable. Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  423 
Table 10.2  (continued) 
Working Families Tax Credit 
(from June 2000) 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit 
Earned Income Tax Credit (2000) 
Programs 




Federal law prohibits EITC from being 
aid, SSI, food stamps, and low-income 
housing. Since 1991, EITC did not count 
for AFDC assessment; states can now 
count EITC when determining TANF 
awards. 
Assessment and Payment Mechanism 
Payable 
Assessment  Assessed on average weekly income in “as- 
sessment period” prior to claim. Length 
of assessment period depends on fre- 
quency of claimant’s earnings: 7 weeks for 
weekly payments, 8 weeks for fortnightly, 
16 weeks for four-weekly,  4  months for 
monthly payments. Estimated earnings 
used for new workers. 
Weekly award fixed for 26 weeks (unless 
family status changes). 
Paid through wage packet unless non- 
earner in couple elects to receive it or if 
self-employed. 
Timing of payments aligned with timing 
of wages, so if worker paid monthly in 
arrears, credit will be paid monthly in 
arrears. Nonearners paid fortnightly. 
Couples decide who receives it. If couple 
cannot agree, then Inland Revenue will 
probably pay to the main carer. 
To whom 
paid 
Assessed at year end on past year’s in- 
come. 
Annual award is a refund on annual tax 
liability with any excess paid as a lump 
sum. Families have to file by April 15 
each year. 
Up to $1,418 can be paid in advance 
through the wage packet for claimants 
who have federal income tax withheld 
from wages. Few elect for this option. 
Married couples who claim the EITC 
have to file a joint tax return. Their EITC 
credit reduces the joint tax liability. They 
nominate who receives the payable part of 
the credit. 
See “Eligibility” for other rules on who 
can claim in nonmarried couples. 
Source: Brewer (2000). 
the working-age population is around one-fifth of that in the United States. 
The rapid growth of the caseload in the United Kingdom is also significant, 
especially given the slower population growth in the United Kingdom: In 
the United States growth was from 216 million to 273 million from 1975 to 
1999, representing 26.4 percent growth, in contrast to U.K. growth of 56.2 
million to 59.5 million, representing just 5.3 percent growth in the United 
Kingdom over the same period. 
So on the face of it, the U.K. system looks generous and well targeted, 
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Fig. 10.9  In-work benefit caseloads 
less impact on labor supply? To answer this we take a look back over the 
last two decades at the whole tax and benefit system in the United King- 
dom as it affects work incentives. 
10.3.2  The Earlier In-Work Benefits in the United Kingdom 
In-work benefits have a long history in the United Kingdom. The first, 
the FIS, was introduced  in  1971. This was  a noncontributory  benefit 
payable to low-income families with children, provided the head of the 
family was in full-time paid work (defined as thirty hours per week, or 
twenty-four if the individual concerned was a single parent). Entitlement 
depended on the family income’s falling below a certain limit. The amount 
payable was half the difference between the family’s income and the rele- 
vant limit3  In addition to receipt of FIS, entitlement to FIS automatically 
conferred a number of “passport” benefits available to those on supple- 
mentary benefit-the  income assistance program for those not in full-time 
work, including free school milk  and meals, prescriptions,  and dental 
treatment (see Dilnot, Kay, and Morris [1984] for further detail). 
Although FIS clearly provided  some financial incentive to work, the 
combined effect of the 50 percent FIS benefit reduction rate, together with 
the impact of housing benefit, tax, and national insurance contributions, 
often resulted in implicit tax rates in excess of 100 percent. For example, 
3. The limits in 1983 were f85.50 per week for a one-child family, with f9.50 for each sub- 
sequent child, with a maximum payment of f22  per week. 426  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
under the FIS system an  eligible worker with housing costs would pay a 25 
percent basic tax rate, a national insurance contribution of 7 percent, a 50 
percent benefit reduction rate on FIS, and an effective Housing Benefit re- 
duction rate of 23 percent, resulting in an implicit tax rate of 105 percent. 
After the FC reform this would reduce to 97 percent-still  high, but below 
100 percent (see Dilnot and Walker 1992). 
Family Credit (FC) 
Introduced in 1988, FC  was an  extension of FIS and was designed to in- 
crease generosity and remove tax rates in excess of 100 percent. It  achieved 
the later objective by fully integrating the in-work credit with the rest of the 
tax and benefit system. An unusual feature of the FC  system, retained from 
the FIS, was the minimum weekly hours eligibility criterion. At its intro- 
duction this was set at twenty-four hours but then reduced to sixteen hours 
in April 1992  to encourage part-time work by lone parents with young chil- 
dren. The FIS had a minimum hours criteria set at thirty hours for work- 
ers in couples and twenty-four hours for single parents. To partially offset 
any adverse incentive effects for full-time work from the later lower hours 
eligibility level, a further supplementary credit at thirty hours per week was 
introduced in April 1995. 
In the FC  system each eligible family was paid a credit up to a maximum 
amount that depended on the number of children. Eligibility depended on 
family net income’s being lower than some threshold (E79.00 per week in 
1998-1999). As incomes rose, the credit was withdrawn at a rate of 70 per- 
cent. In 1996 average payments were around E57 a week, and take-up rates 
stood at 69 percent of eligible individuals and 82 percent of the potential 
expenditure. 
The sixteen-hour reform, proposed in the 1988 review of the U.K. benefit 
system, only became effective in April 1992 and moved the hours eligibil- 
ity rule from twenty-four hours per week to sixteen hours per week (see 
Blundell and Meghir [2002] for a detailed description of this reform). Figure 
10.10 shows the impact on the budget constraint of a typical single parent.4 
Family Credit is treated  as income  in calculating other benefits in- 
comes-this  is not the case for the U.S. system. In the United Kingdom, 
this has the effect of dampening down the incentives in the underlying in- 
work benefit system. The impact of Housing Benefit (rent rebate), which is 
withdrawn at 65 percent, is particularly notable. In the United Kingdom 
once family income falls below a specific level all rental payments are cov- 
ered through the benefit system. For example, in panel B of figure 10.10, 
4. These are constructed using the IFS tax and benefit simulation model TAXBEN (see 
www.ifs.org.uk) designed to utilize the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the FRS used 
in this paper (see the data appendix). Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  427 
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Fig. 10.10  The 1992 hours reform to FC and other taxes and benefits: A, single 
parent in 1991; B, single parent in 1992 
Notes: A,  Single parent, April 1991,  earningE3.00 per hour; B, single parent, April 1992, earn- 
ing f3.00 per hour. 
when the FC becomes available at sixteen hours, the housing benefit de- 
creases substantially, leading to a minimal increase in income. 
Similar budget constraints with very similar effects can be drawn for a 
low-wage couple with children (see Blundell2001). These figures show our 
first central point-the  importance of allowing for the interaction with 
other benefits and taxes, especially where means-tested programs, such as 
Housing Benefit in the United Kingdom, extend up the income distribu- 
tion to such an extent that they overlap extensively with in-work benefits. 
Although these budget constraint pictures show a high replacement rate, 
they do nevertheless suggest some financial incentive to take a sixteen- 
hourjob after the 1992  reform. Do the data confirm this? Recall the picture 
of hours of work for low-education single parents in the United Kingdom 
in section 10.2. This showed a strong peak at the sixteen-hour point. Blun- 
dell (2000) presents a picture of the hours changes before and after the 1992 
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Fig. 10.10  (cont.) The 1992 hours reform to FC and other taxes and benefits: 
A, single parent in 1991; B, single parent in 1992 
Notes: A,  Single parent, April 1991,  earningf3.00  per hour; B, single parent, April 1992,  earn- 
ing f3.00 per hour. 
tends to disappear in 1992 as a spike at sixteen hours becomes more pro- 
nounced. This 16-hour eligibility rule has been maintained throughout all 
the subsequent changes to in-work benefits in the United Kingdom. Inter- 
estingly, as we saw in figure 10.5, the spike at this point in the hours distri- 
bution has also remained a predominant feature of the data for those most 
likely to be eligible for in-work benefits in the United Kingd~m.~ 
Figure 10.10 also highlights our second central point-the  out-of-work 
benefit system over this period was relatively generous and implied a fairly 
high replacement rate for a low-wage working parent. For example, income 
support and housing benefits amount to about &lo0  per week, compared 
to a minimum wage in 1999 of $3.60 per hour. 
In the following discussion we will show that increases in the value of in- 
5.  As mentioned previously, a further thirty-hour supplement to FC in the United King- 
dom was introduced in 1995  (see Duncan and Giles [1996] for a detailed description).  This has 
also been maintained throughout all subsequent reforms and is what gives rise to the second 
peak in the in-work benefit payments in figure 10.7. Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  429 
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work benefits in the United Kingdom typically have been matched by sim- 
ilar increases in the value of out-of-work benefits. Consequently, replace- 
ment rates have remained quite high, contrasting quite dramatically with 
the recent experience in the United States. We return to this theme in the 
following discussion but first complete our brief discussion of the history 
of U.K. in-work benefit reforms. 
The Working Families Tax Credit (  WFTC) 
The replacement of FC-the  WFTC-was  substantially more generous 
and was fully phased in from April 2000. It increased the level of in-work 
support relative to the FC system in four ways: (1) by enhancing the credit 
for families with younger children; (2) by increasing the threshold; (3) by 
reducing the benefit reduction rate from 70 percent to 55 percent; and (4) 
by incorporating a new childcare credit of 70 percent of actual child care 
costs up to a quite generous limit. The effects of these changes relative to 
FC are shown in figure 10.1  1. 
The largest cash gains go to those people who are just at the end of the 
FC  benefit reduction taper. The impact on the budget constraint of a single 
parent is presented in figure 10.12. Again, a similar constraint can be cal- 
culated for couples with children (see Blundell2001). Indeed, because cou- 
ples typically have higher housing costs and are eligible for higher levels of 
in-work credit, the replacement rate for lower hours is even higher. If any- 
thing, this reform increases the incentives for full-time jobs. As we find in 
section 10.5, this is borne out in the simulation model. 
This discussion once again highlights the importance of interactions be- 
tween benefits. The WFTC payments are counted as income in computing 
the entitlement to other benefits, such as Housing Benefit (Rent Rebate). 
The budget constraints show the importance of these interactions in re- 
ducing the impact of the increased generosity in the WFTC. 
Child care credit increases the maximum amount of WFTC by 70 per- 
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Fig. 10.12  A, Single mother before WFTC; B, single mother after WFTC 
Notes; A, Single parent, April 1997, earning E3.50 per hour (2000 prices); B, single parent, 
April 2000, earning E3.50 per hour (2000 prices). 
cent of child care costs up to a maximum of &lo0  per week for those with 
one child or El 50 per week for those with two or more children. The child 
care credit component is available to all working lone parents and to couples 
in which both partners work more than sixteen hours per week.6  The re- 
quirement that both parents work helps to offset the negative incentive to 
work on the second worker in a couple implicit in the family-based calcu- 
lation of the level of the credit in both the WFTC. We return to the impor- 
tance of  this adverse effect on couples in our detailed discussion of the 
WFTC reform in section 10.5. It is also important for the EITC and re- 
occurs in our discussion of the EITC reforms in section 10.4. 
10.3.3  The Impact on Work Incentives 
In the previous discussion the importance of interactions of in-work be- 
6. This is not included in the calculation of the budget constraint figures because the take- 
up of child care credits has been rather low. As we point out in section 10.5, recent figures of 
take-up under WFTC show it to have remained low but increasing quite rapidly. Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  431 
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Fig. 10.12  (cont.) 
nefits with other benefits in the United Kingdom and the level of those 
other benefits has been highlighted. It is central to our understanding of 
the financial incentives to work for low-wage parents in the United King- 
dom. We have seen that the impact of these interactions is to dampen, of- 
ten quite dramatically, the financial incentives to work. To evaluate the 
likely effect of these reforms to the financial incentives to work facing the 
target groups in the U.K. population over the 1980s and 1990s, we consider 
an overall view of changes to the U.K. income support and benefit system. 
We first consider the impact of all reforms on the maximum amount of 
out-of-work income support and the maximum amount of in-work benefit 
over this period since the late 1970s. These figures are presented in figure 
10.13  for  a  single mother  in  the  United  Kingdom.  These  maximum 
amounts simply depend on the hours worked and the number of children. 
They underscore the second important feature of the U.K. system that is in 
direct contrast to the U.S. experience. The real value of  the maximum 
amount of income support in and out of work has remained almost con- 
stant over these two decades. Where in-work credits have increased, espe- 
cially with regard to the recent very large increases in the real value of child 432  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
b f40- 
f30- 




IS, single adult 
WFTClFC basic credit (30  hours or more) 
-  - - WFTCIFC basic credit (under 30  hours)  - 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
B  f50  1 
198819891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002 
IS, 2nd child 
WFTCIFC, 2nd child 
__--  -  IS, 1st child  ----  W FTC/FC, 1  st child  - 
Fig. 10.13 
B, child credit and Income Support: single mother in United Kingdom 
Source: A, Brewer, Myck, and Reed (2001). 
A, Adult credit and Income Support: single mother in United Kingdom; 
credits (see panel B of figure 10.13), they have been matched by very simi- 
lar rises in the child component of out-of-work income support for low- 
income families. The only slight divergence from this rule came in the 1995 
introduction of a supplementary adult credit at thirty hours of work. 
Interesting as these figures are, they clearly miss the differences that have 
occurred due to changes in the minimum hours requirement and to inter- 
actions with taxes and other benefits in calculating actual receipts rather 
than maximum eligible amounts. Figure 10.14 attempts  to capture  this. We 
first ignore Housing Benefit and consider the financial incentives for a 
single parent with two children (one aged less than five and one aged be- 
tween five and ten). They assume that if she works she is paid at the real 
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Fig. 10.14  A, Replacement rate by hours of work for single mother in United 
Kingdom: without housing costs; B, average tax rate for single mother in United 
Kingdom: without housing costs 
hours of work are considered: sixteen, twenty-four, and thirty-five. Panel 
A of figure 10.14  presents the replacement rate computed as the ratio of to- 
tal benefit income if out of work and total disposable income if in work. 
Panel B of figure 10.14  shows the corresponding average tax rate calculated 
as the proportionate loss in earnings in taking a minimum-wage job at 
these hours of work. 
At the beginning of the period the replacement rates for twenty-four- 
and thirty-five-hour jobs were around 60 percent and relatively stable over 
the early and mid-l980s, falling with the introduction of FIS in 1988, es- 
pecially for twenty-four-hour jobs. The replacement rate fell back a little in 
1995 for higher-hour workers after the thirty-hour supplement in  1995.’ 
For sixteen-hour jobs the replacement rate is very high indeed. The biggest 
7. The rise in the replacement rate in 1999 reflects the removal of one parent benefit. This 
is reversed by the introduction of WTFC in the final year of figure 10.14. 434  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
-  0  70%- 




changes in these figures come from the reform in the late 1980s that reduced 
eligibility for in-work benefits to sixteen hours from twenty-four hours. 
Figure 10.15 presents the replacement rate and the average tax rates, in- 
cluding Housing Benefit. The overall pattern is very similar, but the damp- 
ening effect of Housing Benefit is clearly visible. For example, the replace- 
ment rates are, in general, higher for the twenty-four- and thirty-five-hour 
jobs than in panel A of figure 10.14. The drop in the rates for sixteen-hour 
jobs with the 1992 reform is still important but less dramatic. 
These figures serve to underscore our two key points with regard to the 
benefit and tax credit system in the United Kingdom. First, the interaction 
of work-based credits with the tax and benefit system has the effect of 
dampening the financial incentives. This is not a feature of the U.S. EITC. 
Second, where generosity in the work-based credits has increased, it has 
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Fig. 10.15  A, Replacement rate by hours of work for single mother in United 
Kingdom: with housing costs and housing benefit; B, average tax rate for single 
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been typically matched by increases in out-of-work income support for fam- 
ilies with children. This has left the replacement rate and effect tax rates 
rather stable over time. Again, this contrasts importantly with the U.S. 
system, where there has been a relative decline in the value of out-of-work 
income support. The generosity of Housing Benefit and child additions 
to income support in the United Kingdom has left the level of out-of-work 
income for families with children at an increasingly higher rate than that 
in the United States. Four-fifths of all single parents on Income Support in 
1999 were also in receipt of Housing Benefit. 
Two other features of the U.K. experience are probably worth highlight- 
ing at this juncture. First, the U.K. welfare system provides benefits not 
only to lone parents but also to couples with children. This is in contrast to 
the United States, where couples with children are provided substantially 
more limited benefits. In fact, in the United Kingdom, Housing Benefit 
and Income Support are generally higher for couples due to higher hous- 
ing costs and larger families. The upshot of this is that the budget con- 
straint and replacement rate figures for couples on low incomes look very 
similar to those for single parents; indeed, the replacement rates can be 
quite a bit higher. This certainly has some bearing on the much larger inci- 
dence of workless couples with children in the United Kingdom. 
The second factor, which adds to the findings so far, is the growing im- 
portance of housing costs for low-income families over the last two decades. 
This reflected a strong increase in the real level of rents paid in both private 
and public housing over the 1980s. Even though the rules of the housing 
benefit system were left relatively unchanged, the eligible amounts and re- 
ceipts increased dramatically over this period. This was one of the main 
factors behind the rise in out-of-work incomes received by  low-income 
families in rented accommodation over the 1980s (see Giles, Johnson, and 
McCrae [I9971 and Dickens and Ellwood [chap. 8 in this volume], for ex- 
ample). In figure 10.15 the housing benefit is kept at the same 2000 real 
value throughout so that the true picture for someone in the rented sector 
would have an increasing financial disincentive to work, counteracting in- 
creases in in-work benefits. 
10.4  Evidence from the U.S. Reforms 
10.4.1  Programs for the Low-Income Population in the United States 
Out-of-work benefit programs through the welfare system have been the 
backbone of assistance to low-income persons in the United States. Since 
1935, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) has provided 
cash transfers to needy single parents with children. Since the 1960s and 
1970s, the social safety net expanded to provide in-kind benefits to needy 
individuals. The primary in-kind benefit programs include Food Stamps, 436  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
Medicaid (health insurance), and housing subsidies. Eligibility for these 
welfare programs requires satisfying resource restrictions in the form of 
limits on current income and assets. In general, these welfare programs 
have primarily been limited to single parents with children, largely exclud- 
ing married couples and nonelderly persons without children. Although 
some working families receive welfare benefits, they are not in-work pro- 
grams. As with most welfare programs, families receive the maximum be- 
nefit if they are not working and face high benefit reduction rates with in- 
creases in family earnings. As is well recognized, the programs provide 
adverse work incentives. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit began in  1975 as a modest program 
aimed at offsetting the Social Security payroll tax for low-income families 
with children. As we  will discuss more, the generosity of the EITC in- 
creased in the tax acts of 1986, 1990, and 1993. The contrasts between the 
EITC and traditional welfare benefits are many. First, the EITC is provided 
through the tax system rather than the welfare system. Second, eligibility 
for the EITC is available to all low-income families with children, inde- 
pendent of marital status. Third, receipt of the credit requires positive fam- 
ily earnings. Consequently, the EITC creates positive incentives to work 
for single parent families. Because the credit is based on family earnings, 
however, the credit can create adverse incentives to work among married 
couples (Eissa and Hoynes 2004). 
Reforms to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
The basic structure of the EITC has not changed substantially in the 
twenty-five years since its introduction. Eligibility for the EITC depends 
on the taxpayer’s earned income (or in some cases adjusted gross income) 
and the number of qualifying children who meet certain age, relationship, 
and residency tests. Several features of the credit are different from the 
U.K. in-work programs. First, the credit is within the tax system and is a 
refundable credit, so a taxpayer with no federal tax liability, for example, 
would receive a tax refund from the government for the full amount of the 
credit. Second, the credit amount depends on annual income and earnings, 
and virtually all recipients receive the credit in one lump sum at the end of 
the year. Last, the EITC does not count as income in welfare benefit for- 
mulas. As we will see, this difference turns out to be very important. 
The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on the 
taxpayer’s earned income,  adjusted  gross income, and, since  1991, the 
number of EITC-eligible children in the household. There are three regions 
in the credit schedule. The initial phase-in  region transfers an amount 
equal to the subsidy rate times their earnings. In the flat region, the family 
receives the maximum credit. In the phase-out region, the credit is phased 
out at some phase-out rate. 
Table 10.3 summarizes the parameters of the EITC over the history of 
the program. The real value of the credit increased only modestly in the Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  437 
Table 10.3  US. Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters 
Phase-In  Phase-In  Maximum  Phase-Out  Phase-Out 
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$550  12.22 
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$314  7.65 
$2,152  15.98 
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Sources: U.S.  House of Representatives  (2000) and authors’ calculations from OBRA93. 
early years and was due mostly to inflation.8  The 1987 expansion of the 
EITC, passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), represents 
the first major expansion of the EITC. The TRA86 increased the subsidy 
rate for the phase-in of the credit from 11 percent to 14 percent and in- 
creased the maximum credit from $550 to $851 ($788 in 1986 dollars). The 
phase-out rate was reduced from 12.22 percent to 10 percent. 
The 1991 expansion, contained in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1990 (OBRA90), increased the maximum credit and introduced separate 
credit rates for families with two or more children. By 1993, a family with 
two or more children could receive a maximum credit of $1,5  1 1, $77 more 
than a family with one child. 
The largest single expansion over this period was contained in the Om- 
8. The EITC was first indexed to inflation in 1987. 438  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
nibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) legislation. The 1993 expan- 
sion of the EITC, phased in between 1994 and 1996, led to an increase in 
the subsidy rate from 19.5  percent to 40 percent (18.5 to 34 percent) and an 
increase in the maximum credit from $1,511 to $3,556 ($1,434 to $2,152) 
for taxpayers with two or more children (taxpayers with one child). This ex- 
pansion was substantially larger for those with two or more children. The 
phase-out rate was also raised, from 14 percent to 21 percent (1 3 to 16 per- 
cent) for taxpayers with two or more children (taxpayers with one child). 
Overall, the range of the phase-out was expanded dramatically, such that 
by  1996 a couple with two children would still be eligible with income lev- 
els of almost $30,000. 
To summarize the changes in the EITC, figure 10.16 presents the credit 
schedule in 1984,1990,1993, and 1996.  This shows that 1986 and 1993 ex- 
pansions were the most substantial. 
Rejorms to the AFDC Program 
This period saw not only expansions in the EITC but also important 
changes in AFDC, changes that are important for analyzing the financial 
incentives to work. These changes generally take the form of making the 
out-of-work benefits less generous and creating greater work incentives. 
This is the opposite of the trend in the United Kingdom. This difference is 
critical to understanding the “puzzle” here. From the late 1970s  to the early 
1990s  the only substantial change in the AFDC program was a gradual ero- 
sion in the real value of benefits. For example, between 1979 and 1993 real 
benefits for welfare recipients fell by over 30 percent. Even taking into ac- 
count falling real wages for the low-skilled population in this period, bene- 
fits relative to wages still fell by over 15 percent (Hoynes and MaCurdy 
1994). Beginning in the early to mid-l990s, some states made significant 
changes to their AFDC programs through the provision of federal waivers. 
These waivers, as discussed recently by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and 
Schoeni and Blank (2000), increased work incentives by reducing the im- 
plicit tax rate on earned income and expanding work requirements. This led 
up to major federal welfare reform legislation passed in 1996 (the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act or PRWORA) 
that ended the entitlement nature of the AFDC program. The AFDC pro- 
gram was abolished  and replaced  by  Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). 
The major provision of this act is the addition of lifetime time limits on 
welfare receipt, typically five years in length. In addition, states are re- 
quired to increase the work effort of welfare recipients and have been given 
much more flexibility to redesign programs to achieve this goal. Overall, 
these changes have unambiguously led to an increase in the financial in- 
centive to work. 
As we discussed previously, it is important whether the income from in- Taxyear = 1984 
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work programs is taken into account in the calculation of welfare benefits. 
Over time, the rules surrounding the treatment of income from the EITC 
have changed (U.S. House of Representatives 2000). Between 1975 and 
1978, the EITC did not count as income for the calculation of welfare be- 
nefit~.~  However, between 1979 and 1987, the credit was treated as income. 
Since 1988 (the main period of importance), the EITC once again is not 
counted as income. 
10.4.2  The EITC Reforms 
The trends presented in section 10.2 show the quite dramatic increases 
in employment among singlc women with children in the United States. 
The explanations advanced in the literature include the expansion of the 
EITC, increases in the minimum wage, welfare reform, and the sustained 
economic expansion. Of particular interest here is the role played by the 
EITC. An expansion in the EITC leads unambiguously to  increases in em- 
ployment rates for single women with children. The EITC policy reforms 
in 1986, 1990, and 1993 are useful in providing a before-and-after assess- 
ment of their effectiveness in changing labor market behavior. Eissa and 
Liebman (1996) use repeated cross sections of the Current Population Sur- 
vey (CPS) to examine the effect of the 1986 reform on single mothers. They 
consider two comparisons: either the whole group of single women with 
children is used, with single women without children as controls, or the 
group of low-education single women with children is used, with the low- 
education single women without children as controls. The former control 
group can be criticized for not capturing the common macro effects. In par- 
ticular, this control group is already working at a very high level of partic- 
ipation in the U.S. labor market (around 95 percent) and therefore cannot 
be expected to increase its level of participation in response to the econ- 
omy’s coming out of a recession. In this case all the expansion in labor mar- 
ket participation in the group of single women with children will be attrib- 
uted to the reform itself. The latter group is therefore more appropriate as 
it targets better those single parents who are likely to be eligible for EITC, 
and the control group has a participation rate of about 70 percent. 
With these caveats in mind, there remain some relatively strong results 
on participation  effects that come from the Eissa and Liebman  (1996) 
study. For single parents there is evidence of a reasonable movement in to 
work. The expansion of the EITC and other tax changes led to a reduction 
in the relative tax liability of single mothers of $1,331 (1996 dollars), and 
their estimated impact of the expansion was to increase employment from 
9. Although the EITC was counted as income for 1979-1987,  when  it counted as income 
changed somewhat. For part of the period, the credit only counted as income in the month 
that it was received (remember that the vast majority of recipients receive it as  a tax refund in 
one annual payment), whereas in another part of this period, the imputed value of the credit 
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Fig. 10.17  Maximum EITC and difference in annual employment rates (compari- 
son: single women with children to single women without children) 
Source; Liebman (1998) figure 6. 
Notes; Updated through 1998 using unpublished data from Liebman. The employment rate 
figure is based on a CPS sample of single women aged sixteen-forty-five who are not disabled 
or in school. Employment rate difference is the difference between the annual employment 
rate of single women with children and the annual employment rate of single women without 
children. 
73.0  to 75.8 percent. There is also some evidence ofnegative effect on hours 
for those in work, but this is rather small. 
Liebman (1998) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) use a similar ap- 
proach to examine the impact of all three of the EITC reforms. The esti- 
mated behavioral responses are very similar in magnitude to those found 
by Eissa and Liebman (1996). The Liebman results are summarized in 
figure 10.17. The figure plots the difference in employment rates of single 
women with and without children against the difference in the maximum 
EITC credit in 1996 dollars.’O  The figure shows that the relative increase in 
employment rates among single mothers tracks quite closely the expansion 
of the EITC. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) present similar calculations for 
several other comparison groups, including comparing single women with 
10. In the early period, the difference in maximum credit is equal to the credit for families 
with children. Figure 10.17 takes into account that there was a small EITC for childless fam- 
ilies starting in 1994. It is not clear whether Liebman (1998) took this into account in his cal- 
culation. 442  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
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Fig. 10.18  Maximum EITC and difference in annual employment rates (compari- 
son: single women with one child to single women with two-plus children) 
Source; Employment rate differences come from table 6 in Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000). 
Notes; Employment rate differences use a CPS sample of single women aged nineteen-forty- 
four who are not disabled or in school. Employment rate difference is the difference between 
the annual employment rate of single women with two or more children and the annual em- 
ployment rate of single women with one child. 
one child to those with two or more children, single mothers to married 
mothers, and single mothers to black men. Figure 10.18 summarizes the re- 
sults comparing single women with one child to those with two or more 
children. The “treatment” here is that the 1993  EITC expansion was much 
more generous for families with two or more children. These results are 
somewhat less clear than those discussed previously but show an increase 
in employment of single women with two or more children relative to those 
with only one child at the same time that the EITC is becoming more gen- 
erous for larger families.” 
Of course, the EITC reforms were not the only changes affecting the re- 
turns to work during this period. As recently discussed by  Blank (2001), 
11. The employment figures in Liebman (1998) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) are un- 
conditional. The authors state that the general conclusions do not change when adding con- 
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the mid- 1990s simultaneously brought EITC expansions, minimum-wage 
increases, welfare reform, and the very strong labor market.12  Blank argues 
that our ability to determine the relative importance of these factors is lim- 
ited by the fact that the changes were coincident. Despite these difficulties, 
Meyer and Rosenbaum (200 1) examine the determinants of employment 
of single mothers between 1984 and 1996. This period ends before federal 
welfare reform but includes the period when states were experimenting 
with welfare waivers. They use a sample of single mothers with and with- 
out children and model the gains to entering work for the two groups, tak- 
ing into account a rich set of tax and transfer programs. They find that ex- 
pansions in the EITC account for 60 percent of the sizeable increase in 
employment rates, with smaller impacts due to welfare waivers and declin- 
ing real welfare benefits. Ellwood (2000), comparing employment across 
skill groups, also finds changes to welfare and the EITC to have stimulated 
the labor supply of single mothers with children. However, in contrast to 
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), his work finds that welfare program changes 
were slightly more important than the EITC expansions. 
Overall, the literature suggests that the EITC has played an important 
role in the large increases in employment among single women with chil- 
dren. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) is one of the few papers that have consid- 
ered the impact of the EITC on married couples. They use two estimation 
approaches. In the first, they compare the labor market outcomes of mar- 
ried couples with children to married couples without children. In the sec- 
ond, they limit the sample of married couples with children and model 
changes in the returns to work, including tax and transfer policy changes. 
Using both methods, they find that an expansion in the EITC leads to 
modest increases in labor force participation for married men and some- 
what larger decreases in labor supply for married women. That is, they find 
evidence of a negative “income” effect reducing the labor supply of mar- 
ried women. This is precisely the adverse effect that can be expected when 
a work-contingent tax credit is based on a family income and will also be 
found in our evaluation of the likely impact of the WFTC in the United 
Kingdom.I3 
10.5  Evaluating the WFTC Reform 
As was described in section 10.3, the WFTC introduced in October 1999 
is substantially more generous than the prior in-work benefit in the United 
Kingdom-FC.  It increases the generosity of in-work support relative to 
the FC  system in four ways: (1) by enhancing the credit for younger chil- 
12. The federal minimum wage increased in nominal terms from $3.35 in 1990 to $5.15 in 
13. This negative labor supply result for married couples can also be found in Dickert, 
1997. 
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dren; (2)  by increasing the threshold; (3) by reducing the benefit reduction 
rate from 70 percent to 55 percent; and (4) by incorporating a new child 
care credit of 70 percent of actual child care costs up to a quite generous 
limit. As we have argued, there are two important aspects of the U.K. be- 
nefit and credit system that have to be accounted for when assessing any in- 
work benefit reform. First, any increase in generosity will be dampened by 
interactions with means-tested income maintenance schemes, in particu- 
lar, the Housing Benefit scheme. As we  noted previously, four-fifths of 
single parents who do not work and who claim Income Support are in re- 
ceipt of Housing Benefit. Second, increases in the credit for children and in 
the threshold level have been typically matched by increases to income sup- 
port for nonworking parents. As our discussion in section 10.3 stressed, 
this has also been a feature of the WFTC reform. 
10.5.1  Simulating the Reform 
To provide an ex ante simulation of the impact of new reforms like the 
WFTC, a model is required that separates preferences from constraints. 
Such a model is developed in Blundell et al. (2000). This work develops ear- 
lier structural labor supply simulation modelsi4  by Hoynes (1996), for ex- 
ample, and provides a similar framework to Bingley and Walker (1997) 
who considered earlier reforms to the U.K. benefit system. In particular, it 
allows for child care demands to vary with hours worked, and it allows for 
fixed costs of work. It also accounts for take-up by incorporating welfare 
stigma, following on from Keane and Moffitt (1 998).15 This model was es- 
timated and the simulations reported here computed before the WFTC  was 
fully implemented. 
The simulations focus on the two target groups for the WFTC reform: 
single parents and married couples with children. Two samples from the 
1994-1 995 and 1995-1 996 British Family Resources Surveys (FRS) are se- 
lected: single-parent households and married or de facto married couples. 
Excluding self-employed and retired households, together with students 
and those in Her Majesty’s forces, leaves samples of 1,807 single parents 
and 4,694 two-person households for use in estimation. Nearly 50 percent 
of currently working single parents were found to be in receipt of some FC. 
For married couples with children this proportion is smaller, at around 16 
percent. However, the latter group is more than two and one-half times the 
size of the former. 
14. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide a detailed overview of such models. 
15. Introducing  a stigma cost to participation in WFTC allows the simulation model to pre- 
dict a low probability of take-up among those with low eligibility-something  found in ear- 
lier studies of welfare program take-up in the United Kingdom (Blundell and Fry 1986). 
Moreover, it suggests a higher take-up of WFTC (in contrast to FC) for those whose eligible 
amount of credit has increased as a result of the WFTC reform. Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  445 
As we have seen, the WFTC reform is designed to influence the work in- 
centives of those with low potential returns in the labor market. It does this 
via the increased generosity of in-work means-tested benefits. For single 
parents, the WFTC does unambiguously increase the incentive to work. 
For couples, however, the incentives created by  the WFTC can lead to 
lower participation in the labor market. This offsetting effect on employ- 
ment for secondary workers in couples has also been highlighted in the 
context of the EITC reforms; see Eissa and Hoynes (2004) and the previ- 
ous discussion. 
Panel A of figure 10.19 shows the effect of the WFTC reform on the net 
income and hours schedule for a typical eligible single parent. This ac- 
counts for all the interactions in the tax and benefit system and concurrent 
reforms to the income support system. Provided that the fixed costs of 
work are not too high, the financial incentive to move into work for a non- 
participant is clear. There is also an incentive to reduce hours of work 
among those single parents working full time. The balance between these 
is purely an empirical matter, although the EITC analysis, discussed in the 
previous section, suggested that the adverse hours effect would not domi- 
nate the positive participation effect. 
Panel C of figure 10.19  presents a similar example of the financial incen- 
tives facing a male in a married couple where the partner does not work. 
For such couples, where neither parent is working, the incentives are un- 
ambiguously to move into work. Indeed, the gains are far larger than for 
our lone parent example, as the largest cash gains from the WFTC reform 
accrue to those at the end of the current taper. The incentives to change 
hours of work are ambiguous. But one interesting point is the marked in- 
crease in the effective marginal tax rate for those who become eligible for 
WFTC as a result of the reform. This group faces an increase in the mar- 
ginal tax rates, from 33 percent, produced by income tax and National In- 
surance, to just under 70 percent, produced by the interaction of the 55 per- 
cent WFTC taper on posttax income. In the example, the marginal tax rate 
rises from 33 percent to  just under 70 percent above forty hours of work. 
One final point, highlighted in our discussion of the EITC reforms in the 
United States, is the likely incentive for some workers in married couples to 
move out of work altogether. Panel D of figure 10.19 shows the budget con- 
straint for the partner of the man in panel C of figure 10.19. The panel is 
conditional on the man working forty hours a week. Thus the family in- 
come of the woman when she does not work is that shown at the forty-hour 
point. This means that the income at zero hours has increased through the 
WFTC reform. In the example, anyone working more than ten hours has 
an increased incentive to reduce their hours or move out of work alto- 
gether. The situation changes slightly when we allow for child care costs at 
sixteen hours as shown in panel E offigure 10.19.  Here there is an additional 25011 
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Fig. 10.19  WFTC reform budget constraints: A,  lone parent without child care; 
B, lone parent with child care; C,  man in couple without child care; D, woman in 
couple without child care; E, woman in couple with child care 
Notes: A, One child aged under eleven; hourly wage f4.39 (median for lone parents); rent 
f41.10 per week (median for social renters with children); no child care costs; B, one child 
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incentive to work just over sixteen hours to take advantage of the child care 
credit. Thus, the impact on partners in eligible families where there is al- 
ready one worker is again ambiguous. 
WFTC Simulutions: Lone Parents 
In the first section of table 10.4  the simulated work responses to the WFTC 
among the sample of single parents are reported. The simulated transition 
takes around 2.2 percent of the sample from no work to either part-time or 
full-time work, with no offsetting movements out of the labor market. This 
represents nearly a 5 percent impact on employment for this group, which 
has employment rates around 40 percent. To take account of sampling 
variability, a standard error of 0.42 percent is placed around the 2.2 per- 
cent figure. 
Table 10.4  Working Families Tax Credit Reforms, Simulations 
Postreform 
Prereform  Out of Work  Part-Time  Full-Time  Prereform (?XI) 
















58.0  0.7  1.5 
0.0  18.6  0.5 
0.0  0.2  20.6 
58.0  19.4  22.6 
-2.2  0.3  1.9 
Married Women with Employed Partners 
32.2  0.1  0.1 
0.3  31.6  0.0 
0.4  0.1  35.0 
33.0  31.8  35.2 
0.6  -0.1  -0.4 
Married Women with Partners Out of Work 
56.8  0.4  0.9 
0.0  22.2  0.4 
0.0  0.1  19.2 
56.8  22.8  20.5 













Group  Number  Percentage 
Single parents  34,000  2.20 
Married women (partner not working)  11,000  1.32 
Married men, partner not working  13,000  0.37 
Married men, partner working  -10,500  0.30 
Total effect  27,500 
Decrease in workerless families  57,000 
Source: Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) and Blundell and Reed (2000). 
Married women (partner working)  -20,000  -0.57 Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  449 
Table 10.5  Numbers of Families with Children 




Couples: man working 
Total population 
Modeled population 









Source: Department of Work and Pensions (1996). 
To provide the population counterparts to these changes, table 10.5  pro- 
vides the total size of the population and the grossed-up equivalent from 
the FRS sample. One can clearly see the reason for this shift in the earlier 
graphs of the potential impact of the WFTC on single parents’ budget con- 
straints. At or above sixteen hours per week, the single parent becomes el- 
igible for WFTC (with any child care credit addition to which she may be 
entitled). For some women this extra income makes a transition to part- 
time employment attractive. 
We see a minor offsetting reduction in labor supply through a simulated 
shift from full-time to part-time employment among 0.2 percent of the 
sample. This is consistent with a small (negative) income effect among 
some full-time single women, for whom the increase in income through the 
WFTC encourages a reduction in labor supply. Nevertheless, the predom- 
inant incentive effect among single parents is a positive effect on partici- 
pation. 
WFTC Simulations: Women with Employed Partners 
For married women the simulated incentive effect is quite different. The 
second section of table 10.4 reports estimates of the transitions following 
WFTC among a subsample of women with employed partners. There is a 
significant overall reduction in the number of women in work of around 
0.57 percent. This overall reduction comprises around 0.2 percent who 
move into the labor market following the reform, and 0.8 percent who move 
from work to nonparticipation. The number of hours worked by women 
with employed partners is predicted to fall slightly. 
The predominant negative response is clearly not one that is intended, 
but from the earlier budget constraint analysis one can easily see why. 
There will be a proportion of nonworking women whose low-earning part- 
ners will be eligible for the WFTC. The greater generosity of the tax credit 
relative to the current system of FC increases household income. This in- 450  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
crease in income would be lost if the woman in the household were to work. 
And for those women currently in the labor market, the WFTC increases 
the income available to the household if she were to stop working. 
WFTC Simulations: Women with Unemployed  Partners 
In the third section of table 10.4  the incentives for a subsample ofwomen 
whose partners do not work are presented. For this group there is a signi- 
ficant overall increase of 1.32 percent in the number of women who work. 
The reason for this shift is more straightforward and stems from the in- 
creased generosity of the basic WFTC relative to the current FC  system for 
those women who choose to move into work. Note that for this group the 
generosity of the child care credit component of the WFTC is not an issue, 
because households only qualify for the child care credit if both household 
members work sixteen hours or more. There is,  of course, potential for 
both members of an unemployed household to move into work in order to 
qualify for the WFTC that includes the child care credit, but a joint simu- 
lation (not reported here) shows that such an outcome is virtually nonex- 
istent. 
WFTC Simulations: A Summary 
The fourth section of table 10.4 provides an overall summary of the em- 
ployment effects that could be expected from this reform. This table also 
provides the impact on male employment. The impact on single parents is 
quite significant. This is also the case for workless couples with children. 
These are the two target groups we mentioned at the outset. However, “ad- 
verse” effects on couples in which one spouse is working somewhat offset 
these effects. Overall the effects on participation across the two groups of 
men roughly cancel out, leaving the major impact operating through the 
effects on women, mainly single parents. However, if we consider the im- 
pact on workless households alone, then the overall impact of the WFTC 
is predicted to be much more substantial. 
10.5.2  The WFTC Reform-Some  Ex Post Evidence 
The WFTC was introduced for all new recipients in October 1999 and 
fully phased in by April 2000. From recent administrative caseload data 
(Department of Social Security [various years]), the introduction  of the 
WFTC and the substantial increase in generosity appear to have had a 
marked effect on the number of people claiming in-work benefits. Figure 
10.20 shows that caseload has risen by  30 percent in the twelve months 
since May 1999.  Table 10.4  shows that the average award has risen from &63 
to &76  a week over the same period. Average gross weekly income of claim- 
ants is now 5153, and average weekly hours worked are 30.5. Fifty-two per- 
cent of recipients are lone parents. 
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Credit compared to the child care disregard under FC. In May 2000 1  1  1,000 
families were receiving help with child care costs, a 156 percent increase 
over twelve months. The average amount of costs claimed was &32  a week. 
Although this is a large increase, however, this is still only 10 percent of the 
total WFTC caseload (table 10.5). 
Obviously some of the change in WFTC caseload is due to the increased 
numbers of already working parents who qualify for WFTC due to its in- 
creased generosity. This alone cannot be taken as a measure of success in 
increasing employment. We can learn a little more by looking at adminis- 
trative data on cross-benefit flows. Figure 10.21 breaks down the WFTC 
and FC  caseload by their situation twelve months ago. It shows that a large 
component of the caseload increase (around 75 percent, taking the last 
four quarters of  FC as a baseline) since October  1999 has come from 
people who were not claiming any means-tested benefits or tax credits 
twelve months before. Both of these facts are consistent with the increased 
entitlement of the WFTC compared with FC. 
It is informative to compare the predicted labor supply effects discussed 
earlier with the available administrative data. The simulations reported in 
table 10.416 estimate that around 30,000 currently workless lone parents 
with children will enter work as a result of WFTC.” The government’s 
equivalent (and unpublished) estimate for the package of tax and benefit 
reforms is around 40,000 lone parents with children. Although we cannot 
make accurate inferences from this high-level analysis of administrative 
data, we cannot yet see a change of this magnitude in the behavior of lone 
parents. When we compare February 2000 with August 1999, only 5 per- 
cent (10,000 families) of the increase in the WFTC and FC caseload is due 
to lone parents’ moving from Income Support to WFTC. 
There are several important reasons that could explain the discrepancy. 
First, responses to reforms take time. It took two years for the strong peak 
at sixteen hours to appear after the 1992 reform to FC in the United King- 
dom. Second, we have presented an extremely crude analysis that does not, 
for example, control for any underlying changes in the number of lone par- 
ents moving from Income Support to WFTC and FC (for example, the 
number of lone parents moving from Income Support to WFTC and FC 
fell by 7,000 in the twelve months prior to August  1999). Third, we  also 
cannot identify lone parents on other out-of-work benefits. 
Nonetheless, taken together with our simulation results, these adminis- 
trative statistics suggest that the impact of the WFTC reform on employ- 
ment among low-income families in the United Kingdom is positive but 
modest. This supports our overall view that the workings of  the tax and 
16. Similar percentage effects on single parents can be found in the Gregg, Johnson, and 
17. We cannot analyze couples who move into work because of the difficulties in classify- 
Reed (1999) study. 
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benefit system in the United Kingdom, together with the increased gen- 
erosity to workless families with children, mean that changes to financial 
work incentives from in-work benefit reforms are relatively small. 
One caveat to this is the possible impact of the child care credit. Under 
WFTC this is a generous scheme available only to those in work (requiring 
both parents in a couple to work at least sixteen hours), but, as we have in- 
dicated, it is currently taken up by only a small fraction of WFTC recipi- 
ents. If participation in this part of the WFTC program was to expand sig- 
nificantly, it could further encourage labor supply among those low-income 
parents who are currently out of work and claiming Income Support. 
10.6  Summary and Conclusions 
The late 1980s and 1990s saw substantial expansions to the U.K. system 
of in-work benefits. Most recently, in 1999 the FC was expanded and re- 
placed by the WFTC. The goal of these policy reforms was clear: to signi- 
ficantly increase the employment of the targeted groups of lone parents 
and workless couples. However, employment rates of single women with 
children, which declined dramatically with the recession of the early 1980s, 
have remained  low relative to other groups. The United States also ex- 
panded its main in-work benefit program, the EITC, during the late 1980s 
and 1990s. But the U.S. expansions were accompanied by much larger in- 
creases in the employment rates of single mothers and heralded as a great 
policy success. The goal of our paper has been to explore this puzzle and 
determine why the results were different in the United Kingdom. 
Our analysis leads to two key explanations. First, in-work benefits incen- 
tives in the United Kingdom are dulled by integration with the rest of the tax 
and benefit system. Second, in the United States, the expansions to the in- 
work benefits occurred at a time when the out-of-work benefits were being 
reduced. There was no corresponding reduction in the United Kingdom. 
In relation to the first explanation, we point to the significant benefit re- 
duction rate in the Housing Benefit program, inducing only small gains to 
working for those with large Housing Benefit entitlements. Many non- 
working low-income families in the United Kingdom are in this position. 
In the United States, by contrast, the EITC is not counted as  income for the 
calculation of any other transfer program, so the household sees the full 
gain of the in-work benefit. The interaction between in-work benefits and 
other means-tested benefits is of central importance in understanding the 
precise change in incentives that reforms to the in-work benefit system 
have delivered. 
In terms of the second explanation, welfare programs  in  the United 
States underwent major reforms, leading to a decline in the value of stay- 
ing out of the labor force for single mothers. Thus the increase in incentives 
to work through the EITC was strengthened by the decline in the generos- 
ity of out-of-work benefits. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, the out- Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  455 
of-work programs either maintained levels of generosity or, in some cases, 
actually increased generosity in step with the increases in the in-work pro- 
grams. The combination of these two forces meant that the expansions of 
the U.K. in-work programs generated rather modest increases in the in- 
centives to work. 
It is not that we find no positive employment responses to the reforms in 
the United Kingdom. Indeed, there is strong evidence that certain targeted 
groups responded to the incentives in their labor supply behavior. For ex- 
ample, our simulations point to an important impact on single parents, 
drawing more than 30,000 into work and off income support from the re- 
cent WFTC reform. Also, we  find a significant percentage of men and 
women in workless couples move into employment. However, these posi- 
tive increases in employment for workless couples with children are offset 
somewhat by a decrease in the level of employment in couples with children 
where both spouses are working, reflecting the income effect. The reduc- 
tion in workless families is therefore much more substantial than the in- 
crease in employment. 
This can only be a partial assessment of the recent reforms to the struc- 
ture of in-work benefits in the United Kingdom. There are several addi- 
tional issues that have been raised. The first relates to child care. The recent 
reform in the United Kingdom contains a generous child care component. 
If taken up it could significantly improve the labor supply of the target 
groups. Also, it mitigates the offsetting effect on working married couples 
because there is a requirement that both parents work in a couple for eligi- 
bility. On face value, child care should be important. The data show that 
the low attachment rates are concentrated among women whose youngest 
child is below formal school age. Indeed, one interpretation of the experi- 
mental findings in Card and Robins (1998) is that in-work benefits speed 
up the entry into work of mothers with young children. However, to date, 
the take-up among  couples is less than 2 percent, and among  single parents 
it is less than 12 percent. These low take-up rates are something of a puzzle 
and may reflect the time taken for the child care market to adapt. 
Finally, there is the issue of earnings progression. Will the earnings of the 
recipients who are brought into work due to the increased generosity of in- 
work benefit programs see any significant growth in real wages? Will they 
eventually be able to earn their way out of the in-work benefit system? How 
does a tax credit affect incentives for wage progression? Unlike the Cana- 
dian Self Sufficiency Project (SSP) experiment, the U.K. and U.S. systems 
are not time limited. At first sight, this looks to set up the wrong incentives 
for wage progression. Certainly the incentives for individuals to seek out 
wage progression are probably reduced. But, as pointed out by Heckman, 
Lochner, and Cossa (2002), distinguishing between the method of skill for- 
mation is key. Evidence on wage progression for these types of workers is 
sparse, but there are three important and relevant studies-the  Card and 
Robins (1999) study of the wages of the control and treatment groups in the 456  Richard Blundell and Hilary Hoynes 
Canadian experiment, the Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002) study of 
the impact of EITC on skill formation, and the Gladden and Taber (2000) 
study of true experience effects across education and gender groups in the 
United States. All of these studies point to modest wage growth. The first 
study suggests those drawn into the program do not experience signifi- 
cantly lower wage growth, although the level of wage growth is low. The 
second study highlights  the importance  of  distinguishing between  the 
method of skill formation-that  is, whether it is dominated by on-the-job 
learning or learning by doing. The third study shows that, although growth 
is slow, it is rather similar across skill and gender groups. Positive news? 
Yes, but the rates of wage progression are small, and the wage levels of these 
individuals in the United Kingdom are very low. In Blundell(2002) it is ar- 
gued that given the large impact on incomes-and  implicitly on hourly 
wages-that  is brought about through in-work benefits, it is doubtful that 
wage progression alone will lead to any significant movement out of in- 
work benefit receipt. 
Appendix 
Data 
U.K. Labor Market Sources and Definitions 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
The FES is a repeated continuous cross-sectional survey of households 
that provides consistent data on wages, hours of work, employment status 
in last two weeks, and education for each year since 1978. Family Expen- 
diture Survey years correspond to the financial year. Consequently, 1998, 
for example, covers the twelve months up to April 1999. It therefore corre- 
sponds to 1999 in the March CPS data used in the US. comparisons. Prior 
to 1978 the FES contains no information on educational attainment. In 
particular, the survey contains information on usual labor market status. 
Low Education 
We  show trends for all women and trends in a low-education sample 
classified as those who left full-time education at age sixteen or lower. An 
alternative to our method for constructing the education dummy would 
use those who left education at the statutory minimum age as the base 
group. This method is equivalent to ours from 1973 onward in the United 
Kingdom; before this date the minimum school-leaving age was a year 
lower, at fifteen. Nonetheless, interactions between date-of-birth cohort 
effects and the education dummy will capture any effects of the change in Has “In-Work’’ Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?  457 
minimum leaving age on the relative returns to education enjoyed by the 
seventeen-plus group. See Gosling, Machin, and Meghir (2000). We  use 
this criterion to better select women affected by the in-work benefit reforms 
under consideration. 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
the United Kingdom. 
Family Resources Survey (FRS) 
The FRS is a continuous survey with an annual sample size of around 
25,000 private households. It provides detailed income and benefit data for 
individuals in households and is representative of the whole population. 
The LFS is a quarterly survey of some 60,000 working-age individuals in 
U.S. Labor Market Sources  and Definitions 
The March Current Population Surveys (CPS) 
The March CPS is an annual demographic file of between 50,000 and 
62,000 households. For each individual in the household the survey pro- 
vides detailed information on labor market, income, and demographic 
characteristics. In particular,  the survey contains information  on labor 
market status of the last week as well as detailed labor market information 
for the previous calendar year. Our main labor market measure from the 
CPS is work status of the last week, but as an alternative measure we con- 
sider weeks worked in the last year. As for the United Kingdom, we calcu- 
late trends in these labor market variables using women between the ages 
of twenty and fifty-four. We also restrict the sample in this way because we 
do not want to address issues of early retirement and exit from the labor 
market. We present trends in labor market variables by marital status and 
presence of children. 
Low Education 
The low education sample consists of women with no more than a high 
school education (less than or equal to twelve years of education). Again, 
we use this criterion to better select women affected by the EITC. 
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